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The British government has decided to abolish the “Pool”, the electricity spot market 
in England and Wales, and replace it with a series of bilateral markets.  The 
government believes that the Pool has been biased against coal-fired generators, and 
that its price-setting rule (all generators are paid the bid of the marginal unit) has 
inflated the level of prices.  In practice, many of the perceived problems in the Pool 
are the result of market power, not the basic design of the Pool, which is capable of 
sending the right price signals to generators.  Efficient bilateral markets could well 
produce similar results.  Prices could rise, however, if buyers are more risk-averse, 
and less good at trading, than sellers. 
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For many people, the Electricity Pool of England and Wales has been the centrepiece of the 
radical reform introduced in 1990.  The British government created a wholesale market 
through which all generators could sell their output on the same terms.  When combined with 
non-discriminatory access to the transmission system, this made competition in generation 
possible.  Similarly, all retail suppliers could buy electricity on the same terms, and this was 
combined with access to the distribution system to enable competition in supply.  In the years 
after 1990, competition in both generation and supply became a reality, and prices to most 
consumers fell by around 30% in real terms.  Electricity industries around the world were 
encouraged to follow the British example, and the Pool was seen as a central part of it. 
 Despite this, the British government has announced (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1998) that the Pool will be replaced by a series of bilateral markets, as suggested by 
its regulator (Offer, 1998).  In October 1997, the government asked the regulator to consider 
how a review of the Pool might be undertaken; the terms of reference were published at the 
end of January, and interim conclusions in June.  Although these were subject to consultation, 
the regulator’s final proposals were basically unchanged, and these were adopted by the 
government in October 1998, just a year from the start of the process.  The Pool’s critics, 
particularly the coal industry and some large electricity consumers, strongly supported the 
changes. 
 Why is the Pool being replaced?  The “official line” is that it has discriminated 
against coal, and that electricity prices are too high, as a direct result of the way in which the 
Pool works.  The Pool also contains an administered capacity payment which is felt to be 
incompatible with a properly competitive market, while the demand side plays very little part 
in price-setting.  The proposed bilateral markets will be two-sided, and there will be no 
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capacity payment.  They will not favour any fuel against another, and prices are expected to 
fall in the properly “competitive” market. 
 In this paper, I will ask whether these claims are true.  I will start by describing the 
Pool, and the part it has played in the electricity industry since 1990, a part which earned it 
many enemies.  I will then examine the claims that it is biased against coal, and that its 
mechanisms have encouraged artificially high prices.  I ask whether abolishing the capacity 
payment mechanism will have much effect on the pattern of prices.  I will end with some 
comments on demand side participation. 
 
 
The Role of the Pool 
 
The restructuring and privatisation of the electricity industry in England and Wales was 
announced in February 1988, when the government published a White Paper (Department of 
Energy, 1988) which set out its vision of a competitive industry.  The Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) would be divided into the National Grid Company (NGC), for 
transmission, and competing generation companies.  The entire industry would be privatised, 
with the transmission company owned by the 12 Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), to 
ensure its independence from the generators.  The government hoped that this would allow 
entry into generation.  There was also a suggestion that customers would be able to choose 
where to buy their electricity. 
 The RECs were privatised in December 1990, and the industry’s conventional power 
stations in March 1991.  Unfortunately, they had only been divided between two companies, 
National Power and PowerGen, because the government had hoped that the larger of these 
would be large enough to absorb the risks of nuclear power stations.  This was not the case in 
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1990, although the more modern stations were eventually privatised in 1996.  By that time, 
the 50,000 largest customers (taking half the industry’s output) had been given a choice of 
supplier.  This choice was extended to every customer in the country between September 
1998 and June 1999. 
 The White Paper did not contain much detail, because most of the detail behind the 
vision had not been worked out.  Its authors appear to have thought that competition in 
generation would be organised around bilateral physical contracts between generators and 
distributors.  In the event, a “spot market”, the Pool, became the formal centrepiece of 
competition, although financial contracts have been used to hedge much of the trading in this 
market.  The many criticisms of the way in which the Pool has worked make it hard to assess 
how it should have worked, but that assessment is a crucial part to understanding what the 
reforms were meant to achieve. 
 The reformers wanted competition in generation, but they also wished to maintain the 
merit order system, under which the cheapest generators were dispatched first.  While they 
were still planning to organise the industry around physical contracts, this required a 
complicated exchange of obligations, so that cheap stations with contracts that had not been 
called could be used instead of expensive stations with contracts that had been called.  This 
proved impossible to organise in the time available, and the Pool was born.  All stations 
would be dispatched in merit order, for they would all have to bid into a single market, 
organised one day in advance by NGC, using the same dispatch software that the CEGB had 
used to schedule its stations.  This software would now have to use price bids where it had 
previously used internal cost data, for the industry was creating a market, and a new module 
was added to convert those price bids into a System Marginal Price (SMP), based on the bid 
of the most expensive station in normal operation. 
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 SMP was intended to reflect the short-run marginal cost of electricity, but the price of 
electricity has to rise above its short-run marginal cost from time to time, or peaking capacity 
would never cover its fixed costs.  There are several ways of doing this.  In the past, the 
CEGB had simply charged the Area Boards a fixed amount (about £16/kWh in 1988/89) for 
each unit of electricity that they took in the three peak half-hours of the year.i  At one stage, 
the industry considered requiring suppliers to back all of their energy demand with “capacity 
tickets”.  This could lead to problems with “free riding”, however, if suppliers failed to buy 
enough tickets, or generators sold tickets without providing reliable capacity.  We would 
have needed a clearing system to match demand to tickets, and tickets to capacity, and on the 
rare occasions when demand threatened to exceed capacity, this would have given generators 
more market power than the buyers were willing to countenance.  In a very competitive 
market, we might expect that prices would equal marginal cost as long as there is any spare 
capacity at all, but that they would rise, almost without limit, at the rare times when there is 
no spare capacity.ii   
 In the end, the industry decided to smooth the cost of capacity, charging for it on the 
expected cost of power cuts, rather than on the actual cost.  A computer program calculated 
the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) and the government set the Value of Lost Load 
(VOLL).  The capacity payment was set equal to LOLP × (VOLL - SMP): the probability of 
a power cut multiplied by its expected cost.iii  Power Stations which were available would 
receive the capacity payment, whether or not they generated.  If they generated, they would 
receive SMP as well. 
 The Pool was the centrepiece of the new market, in that almost all generation had to 
be sold to the Pool, at the Pool Purchase Price (PPP) of (1 - LOLP) × SMP + LOLP × VOLL.  
Various other costs were recovered in an Uplift charge, and this was added to PPP to give the 
Pool Selling Price which had to be paid by almost all demand.  It is impossible for either 
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generators or suppliers to free-ride, since generators are only paid if they are available, and 
all demand pays its share of the cost of capacity.  Since all parties have the option of trading 
at Pool prices, we would expect any other prices at which trading takes place to converge to 
their level.  In that sense, the Pool is the centre of the wholesale market. 
 
 
Contracts 
 
In practice, however, most participants want to trade at prices which are less volatile than the 
Pool’s half-hourly prices.  Contracts for Differences (CfDs) allow them to do this, and 
between 80% and 90% of electricity trades have been hedged with CfDs.  With a two-way 
CfD, the parties agree a strike price for a fixed quantity of electricity, and whenever the Pool 
price is below the strike price, the buyer will pay the seller the difference between the two.  
When the Pool price is higher, the seller refunds the difference.  If a generator produces the 
amount of electricity covered by its CfD, then its revenues are fixed by the strike price.  With 
this type of CfD, however, the Pool price still determines the generator’s incentives at the 
margin.  If the Pool price is below the station’s marginal cost, the generator will make more 
by simply collecting difference payments, and not trying to run.  Submitting bids equal to the 
station’s costs should ensure that the station only runs when the Pool price is above its costs.  
CfDs can therefore hedge a station’s revenues while still giving it an incentive to operate 
efficiently. 
 The capacity payments mechanism can also be combined with appropriate CfDs to 
promote efficient decisions about plant closures.  For at least twenty years, the level of 
capacity in England and Wales has been “fine-tuned”, not by new investment, but by bringing 
forward or delaying the closure of old stations.  CfDs exist which make payments with 
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reference to the capacity payment alone, and the strike price should be based on the expected 
value of capacity payments over the year.  If there is a lot of spare capacity, this expected 
value should be low, and less than the cost of keeping at least some of this capacity open.  
That can be seen as a market signal that closures would be appropriate, remembering that the 
capacity payment is intended to reflect the expected value of the energy that would be lost 
through capacity shortages.  When there is less spare capacity, the expected capacity payment 
will be higher, raising the value of the CfD, and signalling that stations should be kept open.  
While the CfD can “lock in” revenues for a station that is kept available throughout the year, 
the station is still free to make day-to-day decisions about its availability on the basis of the 
capacity payment expected for the following day.  It should be efficient to make the station 
available whenever the expected capacity payment exceeds the cost of doing so, but not when 
the expected capacity payment is lower.  This efficient course of action should also be 
privately profitable, for the owner of a single station. 
 That caveat is critical.  For most purposes, we can treat the owner of a single station 
as a price-taker, who should respond in an efficient manner to the signals provided by the 
Pool.  Most of the capacity in England and Wales, however, has been owned by larger 
companies with many stations each.  These companies are not price-takers, and if they 
withdraw some of their capacity from the market, the capacity payments received by the 
remainder will rise (Newbery, 1995).  The larger generators will maximise their profits by 
keeping the industry’s capacity at less than the efficient level, unless the smaller companies 
are able to provide enough capacity to offset any withdrawals.  Similarly, the larger 
companies maximise their profits by bidding some of their stations above their marginal 
costs: the stations which raise their bids may be displaced in the merit order, sacrificing 
market share, but the infra-marginal stations earn more from the higher level of SMP (Green 
and Newbery, 1992). 
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 There are two ways in which this market power can be restrained.  One is through the 
contract market, for a generator which has covered most of its output with CfDs is practically 
indifferent to the Pool price in the short term (Green, 1999).  In the medium term, however, 
the generator is likely to be aware that contract prices depend on expected Pool prices, and 
that raising Pool prices, even though it is not immediately profitable, will raise the company’s 
future revenues.  The second route is through entry.  Unless there are barriers to entry, the 
incumbents must keep prices just below the level at which entry is profitable, or lose market 
share to new stations.  The industry rapidly developed a package of linked contracts - a CfD 
for electricity, a long-term gas purchase contract, and project finance for building the station - 
that removed most of the risks from entry, and made the market for very long-term contracts 
contestable.iv  At the time of the restructuring, when a large number of three-year contracts 
were signed, the government was relying on these two mechanisms to produce an acceptable 
outcome in the generation market (Hunt, 1992). 
 The Pool was designed in a hurry, and the designers knew that they had not created a 
perfect market.  In practice, the Pool is not really an organisation, but a contract, the Pooling 
and Settlement Agreement, which all electricity companies have to sign.  The Pool has a 
Chief Executive with a small staff, but most of its operations are sub-contracted to NGC, and 
it is governed by its members.  The Pool Rules specify the procedures which NGC will 
follow in operating the market, and give the formulae for converting bids into prices.  The 
Agreement contains clauses which allow its own modification, but the process has turned out 
to be tortuous.  If a problem is identified, a sub-committee will be established to find a 
solution, and its proposals will eventually reach the monthly meeting of the Pool Executive 
Committee.v  If the executive approves the proposals, work can start on implementing them, 
unless one of the member companies requests a Pool Members’ Meeting, followed by a vote, 
followed by a weighted vote (with weights based on market shares).  After this, the Pool’s 
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own procedures are exhausted, but a dissenting company can still appeal to the regulator, 
blocking the decision for another two or three months (and sometimes changing it).  Several 
issues were identified as “too difficult” to resolve in time for the market opening in 1990, and 
were placed in a schedule for subsequent decisions.  Most of them were going to create 
winners and losers, (which is why they could not be decided in 1990) and the Pool has not 
been particularly successful in dealing with them: in many cases, losers have exploited their 
powers of delay to the utmost, and the original deadlines for finding a solution are long past. 
 
What has happened since 1990? 
 
Special contracts were drawn up to avoid unpleasant surprises when the electricity industry 
was restructured.  The generators were privatised with three-year contracts to buy fixed 
quantities of British coal, at above the world market price, and to sell electricity to the RECs.  
The prices in the electricity contracts were high enough to cover the cost of the coal (with a 
profit margin for the generators), and the RECs were allowed to pass the cost of the 
electricity on to their captive smaller consumers.  This largely insulated the electricity 
companies from unforeseen events until three years after the restructuring (safely past the 
next General Election), and also protected the coal industry from competition.  Small 
electricity customers would pay slightly higher prices in the first year, but after that, their 
prices would be held constant in real terms.   
 The government expected that Pool prices would be based on the cost of imported 
coal, since this would determine the generators’ marginal cost.  Larger electricity customers, 
able to shop around, could avoid paying any premium for the coal industry by choosing a 
supplier who was buying from the Pool, and so there was no attempt to make them contribute 
towards the cost of British coal.  Instead, the electricity industry agreed contracts to cover 
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sales to these consumers, at prices based on the forecast Pool price, which typically implied 
reductions of up to 10% on the prices they had been paying.  
 At first, Pool Prices were very low: much lower than the government had expected.  
The generators’ contracts made them largely indifferent to Pool prices, and gave them an 
incentive to bid low and burn as much coal as possible.  In April 1991, however, some of 
these contracts expired, and the generators felt able to raise prices (Helm and Powell, 1992), 
as shown in figure 1.  Some large customers had been persuaded to buy at Pool prices, rather 
than at the contract prices which had turned out to be more expensive in 1990/1, but this left 
them exposed to the increase.  Their complaints (and those of the RECs) led to the regulator’s 
first enquiry into the major generators’ behaviour: so far, he has published more than ten 
reports on competition in generation.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 The first reports concluded that Pool prices had been below the level of the 
generators’ avoidable costs, and that it was difficult to object to an increase, although some 
specific bidding strategies were criticised.  The regulator also criticised some features of the 
Pool Rules which led to price spikes, when the price might treble (or worse) for two or three 
half-hours.  In the early years, this was often due to the way in which the scheduling program 
looked for spare capacity when there was little available, choosing to run expensive stations 
(which then set SMP), but this has now been changed.  Spikes still occur from time to time, 
largely when the program reacts in an unexpected way to a particular bid: the complexity of 
the program and the bids sometimes make it hard to determine the cause of a particular 
outcome.  Price-setting is a mechanistic process which occasionally seems to give absurd 
results, but because contracts have been written around this process, the prices have to stand.  
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Price spikes have been a big irritation to those larger customers who buy at Pool prices, 
although their main cause of complaint is still the average level of prices. 
 In his first reports, the regulator did not object to the level of prices, but in 1993 he 
decided that recent price increases had been unjustified, and threatened to refer the companies 
to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.  To avoid this, they promised to keep prices 
down for the next two years, and to sell about 15% of their plant.  They complied, and the 
real time-weighted Pool Selling Price fell in each year between 1993/94 and 1996/97.  Prices 
and quantities are positively correlated, and so the demand-weighted price (not shown) is 
higher than the time-weighted price, particularly between 1994/95 and 1996/97, when 
capacity payments were high.  Note that the lower capacity payments of 1997/98 were more 
than offset by an increase in SMP, as the major generators raised their bids to maintain their 
revenues, and were criticised for this by the regulator. 
 
 
Entry 
 
National Power and PowerGen might argue that the market is now far more competitive than 
when it was first established, and figure 2 shows how market shares have evolved since 
1989/90 (when the companies existed in “shadow” form).  Nuclear output has increased 
significantly: the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors which had been under construction since 
the 1960s finally began to produce significant amounts of power, and a Pressurised Water 
Reactor at Sizewell B was commissioned in 1995.  There has also been a dramatic rise in the 
output of “independent power producers” (IPPs), almost all of them Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) stations.  Both trends have depressed the incumbent generators’ market 
shares.  The market has become further fragmented in the last two years of the figure, when 
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Magnox Electric (owning the older nuclear stations) which was not privatised, was split off 
from Nuclear Electric, which was.  Finally, Eastern Group has acquired the 6 GW of coal-
fired capacity which the regulator persuaded National Power and PowerGen to sell.  The 
regulator believed that these sales were needed because although the major generators were 
losing market share, they still owned almost all the mid-merit stations which actually set the 
System Marginal Price.  They could still influence this price, even though their declining 
market shares made it less attractive to do so. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
 Most of the early IPPs were not truly independent, but affiliated to the RECs, which 
had been allowed to invest in generation, within limits.vi  The stations had “back-to-back” gas 
purchase and electricity sales contracts, and since they faced few price risks, they could be 
largely debt-financed.  The RECs faced a potential conflict of interest, since they could pass 
the cost of their electricity purchases on to their captive smaller customers, while their own 
stations’ revenues contributed to their profits.  The RECs therefore had to be able to persuade 
the regulator that their purchase contracts were “economic”, but the incumbent generators 
were quoting high contract prices at the time, which gave the RECs a case to argue.  The 
stations did have the effect of reducing the existing generators’ market power, but the high 
prices which the incumbents were quoting also allowed the new stations to sell their output at 
prices well above the avoidable costs of the existing stations which they displaced.  
Practically all the costs of a new station are avoidable at the time when the decision to build 
is made, while many of the costs of existing stations are sunk.  While the existing stations are 
sufficient to meet demand (which was the case in England and Wales at this time; few 
stations were due to retire) then investment in new stations can only be justified on cost 
 13 
grounds if their total costs are lower than the avoidable costs of the stations which are 
displaced.  This does not seem to have been the case for most of the investment of the early 
1990s. 
 The CCGTs have had environmental advantages: they have practically no sulphur 
emissions, and their carbon emissions are far lower than those of coal-fired stations.  These 
environmental advantages have been one reason why the incumbent generators have also 
built CCGTs, and have been able to scale back the investments in Flue Gas Desulphurisation 
equipment proposed at the time of their privatisation.  The need to reduce sulphur emissions 
would have justified building CCGT stations from the middle of the 1990s onwards, by 
which time some of the older coal-fired stations would also be due to retire (Newbery, 1994).  
But environmental constraints are not yet tight enough to justify the 14 GW of gas-fired 
capacity which has already been commissioned, with another 4 GW under construction. The 
over-rapid investment in the stations has increased the electricity industry’s costs, and 
hastened the decline of the British coal industry.  
 The UK’s coal output fell by one-third between 1982 and 1992, from 125 to 85 
million tonnes, but British Coal’s employment fell by nearly four-fifths, as the corporation 
concentrated its output on its more productive mines.  In 1982, British Coal employed around 
a quarter of a million workers, but this had fallen to roughly 50,000 by 1992.  During that 
year, it became clear that the generators wanted to reduce their purchases from 70 million 
tonnes (in 1991/2) to 30 million tonnes a year (from 1994/5 onwards), and that this would 
result in the loss of another 30,000 jobs.  This sparked a political crisis, resolved with 
promises of government assistance, but the stations which were crowding coal out of the 
industry’s fuel mix already had contracts.  The government was not willing to tear up these 
contracts, and was unable to increase the amount of coal burned.  It was able to persuade the 
electricity industry to agree to another set of linked coal and electricity contracts, passing on 
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the excess cost of British coal to the RECs’ franchise consumers.  The coal price was falling, 
however, reducing the premium in the electricity contracts.  These had to expire in 1998, 
when the RECs’ franchise over small consumers was due to end, in case competition made it 
impossible to pass on further premia. 
 The coal industry was privatised in a series of trade sales in 1994, with a single 
company, RJB Mining, buying most of the mines in England and Wales.  There have been 
further closures and redundancies since the privatisation, as RJB has tried to bring its costs 
down to a level competitive with imported coal.  Although transport costs give the British 
industry an advantage, the world coal price (in sterling terms) has weakened, and so the target 
has been moving in the wrong direction.  Furthermore, while reducing costs will help the coal 
industry compete with imported coal, the greater threat to British coal still comes from losing 
market share to gas-fired stations. 
 
 
The Pool Review and the Energy White Paper 
 
In the Autumn of 1997, it became clear that the generators’ demand for coal would fall 
further.  By that time, however, Britain had a Labour government, with historical ties to the 
miners, and a slightly more interventionist mindset than the Conservatives.  Existing 
contracts remained sacrosanct, but the government announced a temporary moratorium on 
new power stations.vii  This would not affect the amount of coal burned in the next two years 
(since it only affects stations not yet under construction) but had symbolic importance as a 
statement of support for the coal industry.  The moratorium would last while the government 
reviewed its energy policy, and the regulator was asked to review the electricity trading 
arrangements in England and Wales. 
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 The coal industry and many large industrial customers seem to believe that the Pool is 
biased and works to their direct disadvantage.  They argue that the fundamental problem is 
the way in which the Pool pays the System Marginal Price, SMP, to all the stations which are 
scheduled to generate normally, regardless of their bid.  Nuclear stations, and many CCGTs, 
bid close to zero, which ensures that they run, while they are allowed to earn a price set by 
other stations, usually coal-fired.  These stations have to bid realistic prices, and coal is 
crowded out of the market as a result, undercut by unrealistic bids.  Those large customers 
who have even and predictable demands would like to be able to contract directly with 
“baseload” stations, and object to paying peak Pool prices which reflect the costs of peaking 
and reserve plant.  Paying all generators the same price is also believed to increase market 
power, since a large generator need only raise the bid of its marginal stations in order to 
increase its earnings from all of its plant. 
 Capacity payments are seen as an administered mechanism which should have no 
place in a competitive market, and allows the generators to earn high prices at the expense of 
their customers.  As a short-term signal, it cannot support long-term investment in capacity, 
while it does not even signal short-term shortages well - a station is deemed to contribute to 
capacity for eight days after it becomes unavailable, as an anti-gaming device to discourage 
short-term capacity withholding. 
 The Pool has largely ignored the demand side of the market: generation is scheduled 
against a demand forecast provided by NGC, which is expressly forbidden to take account of 
any response to high prices on the part of customers.  There has been a small-scale demand 
side bidding scheme since 1993, in which a few large customers bid “demand reduction 
blocks”.  These are treated as generation by the Pool, occasionally set SMP, and are self-
despatched by the customer, who is required to reduce demand whenever SMP exceeds their 
bid.  In return, the price for that demand block (when it is being taken) does not include the 
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capacity payment, on the grounds that no additional capacity is needed to supply this 
reducible demand - when capacity grows short, the demand will be reduced.  The scheme is 
unpopular with customers, who feel that it does not offer them enough in return for managing 
their demand, but the electricity companies do not want to offer any more.  Since there is 
political and regulatory pressure in favour of demand side bidding, but the electricity 
companies determine what happens in the Pool, the present scheme has continued to limp 
along.  There is a second opportunity for demand management, however, because NGC now 
runs annual auctions for short notice reserve, open to generators and customers who can be 
dispatched by NGC when required. 
 There were other concerns: bids in the Pool are “non-firm”, so that generators are not 
penalised if they fail to follow their operating schedules; the mechanism for converting a 
five-part bid into a single price was felt to be too complex; and hedging markets remained 
under-developed, despite eight years of Pool trading.  One reason for this was felt to be the 
risk of market manipulation by the major generators, but the complexity of the price-setting 
process was also blamed.  Finally, the nature of the Pool’s governance procedures, and its 
record on past reforms, meant that few people believed it was capable of reforming itself. 
 The regulator’s review accordingly proposed a new set of markets to replace the Pool.   
“They include 
• forwards and futures markets operating up to several years ahead if required; 
• a short-term bilateral market, operating from at least 24 hours ahead to about 4 hours 
before a trading period, to give market participants the opportunity to “fine tune” their 
contract positions; 
• a balancing market from about 4 hours before until real time, to enable the National 
Grid Company as System Operator to balance the system and resolve transmission 
constraints by accepting bids to buy or sell electricity; and 
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• a settlement process for calculating a price to recover the System Operator’s costs of 
dealing with imbalances and for charging generators and suppliers who were out of 
balance. 
The present Pooling and Settlement Agreement would be replaced by a Balancing and 
Settlement Code to which market participants would be required to conform, and which 
would include more flexible and effective governance arrangements.”  (Offer, 1998, pp. 1-2) 
 These markets would all be bilateral, for NGC would act as the counter-party to all 
trades in the balancing market, and for all imbalances.  These bilateral contracts would be 
firm, so that parties would be financially committed to their positions as soon as the contracts 
were agreed.  It will always be possible to escape physical delivery or acceptance (and must 
be, given the random nature of generator availability and customer demand), but this will 
now involve either trading in the balancing market, or having to “cash out” an imbalance, 
with the risk of a penal price in either case.  The balancing market would involve simple one-
part bids. 
 In October 1998, the government published a White Paper (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 1998) which broadly accepted the regulator’s proposals.  “The core elements 
address the fundamental concerns of customers and others.  They would address the current 
distortions that work against flexible generation plant and in favour of other plant, and help to 
provide a level playing field between different fuel sources” (ibid., p. 49).  The government 
also confirmed that it would generally block applications for new gas-fired plant “in the 
interim while the reform programme is under way. ...  The policy will be short-term, 
temporary and aimed specifically at protecting diversity and security of supply while the 
distortions in the market are removed, so that the final result is a competitive market that can 
operate more vigorously and effectively” (ibid., p. 12).  The government would also be 
“seeking practical opportunities for divestment by the major coal-fired generators” (ibid., p. 
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11).  PowerGen had already agreed to sell 4 GW of plant, in return for permission to buy East 
Midlands Electricity, one of the RECs, and National Power offered to sell 4 GW if it was 
allowed to buy Midland’s Electricity’s supply business.  These sales could make the 
electricity market more competitive.  I do not believe that the new trading arrangements will 
do so. 
 
 
What is wrong with marginal pricing? 
 
There have been many claims that the Pool’s system of marginal pricing has promoted 
inefficient entry, and raised prices, compared to the results of a bilateral market in which 
every trade is concluded at the price bid.  The argument seems to be that a seller who is paid 
more than they ask for is getting too much, since they are free riding on high prices set by 
other participants.  To quote the White Paper, this “give[s] a positive advantage to smaller 
players in the market, who are able to opt out of competition by bidding zero all or most of 
the time” (ibid., p. 8). 
 The question is, would paying stations their own bid, as with bilateral trading, 
produce different results?  If we consider many other commodities markets, selling prices are 
clustered around a “going rate”.  Some trades will be slightly cheaper, some slightly more 
expensive, depending on the relative knowledge, risk aversion, and ability of the buyers and 
sellers, but no-one will deliberately sell their product for less than they could get from 
another customer, or buy it for more than they could pay elsewhere.  The Pool is not unusual 
in that all trades take place at the same price, but in that it turns this empirical regularity into 
a market rule.  But what would the stations which presently submit low bids in the Pool do if 
they were paid their own bid? 
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 In a bilateral market, we can assume that every seller will attempt to get the going rate 
for their product in each time period.  They will have to be able to charge different prices at 
different times, or the market will be unable to differentiate between fixed costs and running 
costs, which could lead to great inefficiency.  What will the going rate be?  In a competitive 
market with perfect information, every station could afford to bid just less than the marginal 
cost of the cheapest station which is not required - the first extra-marginal station.  That 
station will not be able to make a profit if it tries to undercut them, and nor will any of the 
more expensive stations.  With perfect knowledge, the cheaper stations have no incentive to 
undercut this price, since they will not sell any more output with a lower price, and will only 
be giving away potential profits. 
 Continuing with perfect information, but adding market power, we know that the 
larger generators in a marginal-price system will bid above their costs (Green and Newbery, 
1992).  In a pay-bid system, would they try to sell at the same (high) price from the most 
expensive station which is going to run?  And if they did so, would they set the same price for 
all their other stations?  They have taken the response from consumers, and other sellers, into 
account when calculating the profit-maximising bid in the marginal-price system.  If these are 
price takers, their response should not change in a pay-bid market.  So we might expect large 
generators to set prices above costs for their marginal stations, even in a pay-bid system, and 
to raise all their other prices in line with this.  Auction theory has many “equivalence results”, 
which show how two apparently different trading rules turn out to give the same expected 
revenue, and this could well be one of them. 
 Would generators continue to sell power at this going rate in a more realistic setting, 
with imperfect information?  Those who are bad at trading will probably fail to do so, and 
those who are desperate to sell might deliberately attempt to undercut the rate, to increase the 
chance that they will find a buyer.  Will generators be desperate to sell?  If they don’t sell 
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power in the long-term markets, they have another chance in the short-term market, and if 
that leaves them with an unsuitable schedule, they can trade with NGC in the balancing 
market.  If all else fails, they may even be able to get away with deliberately creating an 
imbalance by running without having sold their output in advance, and accepting the risk of a 
very low imbalance price.  Assume that customers have bought power to cover their expected 
demand, and that a station which “ought” to be running (being one of the cheaper stations 
available) has not been able to sell its output.  That implies that one of the stations which has 
sold some output has higher costs than the unsuccessful station.  There is an arbitrage 
opportunity here, for both the high-cost station and the low-cost station could increase their 
profits if the low-cost station ran instead, selling power to meet the high-cost station’s 
obligation to run at a price somewhere between the costs of the two stations.  This reasoning 
implies that generators will not lose much if they are not scheduled in the early rounds of 
trading, while a generator which sells too cheaply has locked itself in to a low price for good. 
 What about the buyers’ trading skills and risk aversion?  Most wholesale electricity 
buyers are retailing power at fixed prices with thin margins.  They may well be more eager 
than the generators to “lock in” to a purchase contract, and willing to overpay for the 
privilege.  Furthermore, figure 3 shows that all but one of the companies with the most 
electricity to trade are net generators.  The shaded bars give each company’s supply business 
sales: the part below the horizontal axis represents (approximately) the amount which RECs 
have bought under long-term contracts from IPPs, or generators’ sales through their own 
supply businesses, neither of which are part of the “normal” contract market.  Sales by the 
RECs linked with large generators are not netted off, since these RECs are not allowed to buy 
from their linked generator for resale to customers in their own areas.  The companies with 
the most at stake are likely to have the greatest incentive to hire the best traders.  If they 
succeed in doing so it will tend to be the buyers, and not the sellers, who end up on the wrong 
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side of the going rate in the reformed market.  The government’s claim that small players 
have an advantage under marginal pricing might well be reversed: they have a disadvantage 
under pay-bid.  Unfortunately, the small players in question could well be customers. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 If generators gave quantity discounts, (some) customers’ prices could fall, and the 
large customers may be hoping for this.  In a competitive market, a firm may give a quantity 
discount to a large customer as a competitive device to ensure that the firm, rather than a 
rival, gets the advantages of large-scale production; some large orders can have a significant 
impact on the firm’s production schedule.  Discounts can also reflect the lower costs of 
organising the trade, and pass on the benefits of cheaper bulk delivery.  But large electricity 
customers already get lower supply charges and distribution charges, which pass on the 
savings in organising and delivering their purchases.  And in the electricity industry, 
production does not depend on making deals with particular customers.  Only a handful of 
customers actually take a significant amount of electricity from the point of view of a 
generator.  Why should a generator sell a small portion of its output to selected customers at 
below the going rate, when it could get the market price elsewhere?  I know that the CEGB 
did so, and that some customers mourn the passing of this regime, but it is not a feature of a 
competitive commodities market.  Brokers may give lower commission rates to favoured 
clients, but few follow Nick Leeson in selling below the market price. 
 Has the Pool been the cause of inefficient entry and operating decisions?  There are 
two aspects to this: first is the decision to enter; second, the amount of generation from a new 
station.  There have been claims that there has been too much entry, and that the new stations 
have been running, even when coal-fired stations had lower operating costs.  Decisions to 
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enter the market have been a response to the falling cost of CCGT stations, and to the 
incumbent’s market power, which gives entrants the prospect of high prices.  I have already 
argued that changing to a pay-bid system is unlikely to reduce prices.  It might make entry 
more difficult, because the market will be less transparent.  In that case, the incumbent 
generators could have more scope to keep prices high without provoking entry, again to the 
disadvantage of consumers. 
 The load factors of existing stations ought to depend upon their relative costs.  If 
every station bid its costs into the Pool, then the cheapest stations should be selected to run.  
A station which bids less than its costs runs the risk that it will be scheduled to operate at a 
time when the Pool price will be below its costs, and so the station will lose money by 
running.  A standard, “firm,” contract for differences will not affect this conclusion, because 
the payments under the contract, which may raise the station’s revenues, are independent of 
the station’s running patterns.  If gas-fired stations were bidding their costs, then they would 
only be in the wrong place in the merit order if coal-fired stations were bidding above their 
costs, and that would again be a problem of market power, not of the trading arrangements. 
 In practice, many gas-fired stations have bid less than their marginal costs.  There 
have been suggestions that this is due to the take-or-pay nature of their gas contracts, but 
most  of those contracts give the station some flexibility over the amount of gas it burns, and 
only a contract with a rigidly fixed volume (up and down) would have a marginal cost of 
zero.  Even then, if gas-fired stations were inefficiently displacing coal-fired stations, this 
implies an arbitrage opportunity: the gas contract could be renegotiated with a lower volume, 
and the resulting savings shared between the generator and the gas supplier. 
 The main problem is actually due to the electricity sales contracts which many of the 
CCGTs have signed.  These are “non-firm” CfDs, so that the station gets the (high) contract 
price whenever it generates, but no payments are made if it does not run.  This appears to 
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give the station every incentive to ignore the Pool price, and run as much as possible, even if 
cheaper stations are available.  Once again, however, there should be an arbitrage 
opportunity, in which the contracts could be renegotiated to allow cheaper coal-fired stations 
to run, sharing the savings among the parties.  Once again, there is no sign that any of these 
opportunities has been taken up.  The decline of the coal industry is not because of the Pool, 
but despite the Pool, because its price signals have been ignored. 
 The industry’s failure to arbitrage so far is also a bad portent for the efficiency of the 
new trading arrangements.   They can only lead to an efficient dispatch if a second stage of 
trading allows companies to replace expensive, contracted, generation with cheap generation 
which has not yet been scheduled.  Given enough time, and no impediments such as market 
power, this could happen, though it sounds a little like the "twin pool" system which had to be 
abandoned in 1989.  But one of the Government's main reasons for changing the system is the 
belief that generators are burning gas when it would be cheaper to burn coal.  If generators are 
deliberately avoiding an efficient dispatch at present, why should we expect them to be 
interested in spending time and money in trading their way towards an efficient dispatch in the 
future? 
 
 
Paying for Capacity 
 
Capacity payments are one of the most disliked features of the Pool.  For much of the time, 
they contribute practically nothing to the Pool price, and might as well be ignored, but at 
some peak times, they can add several hundred pounds per MWh to the Pool Purchase Price, 
and slightly more to the Pool Selling Price, which includes the cost of capacity payments to 
stations which have not been scheduled to run.  Critics argue that an administered mechanism 
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has no place in a competitive market, and that the capacity payments do not provide adequate 
signals, either in the short term or the long.   
 I have already argued that since capacity payments can be hedged in an annual 
market, this provides a suitable signal for plant retirements.  If a station can sell a hedge with 
revenues which equal or exceed the cost of keeping it open, doing so will not only be 
privately profitable, but also socially efficient, as long as the capacity payments are 
calculated in an appropriate manner.  Furthermore, adjusting capacity at the margin should 
drive the expected capacity payment to equal the cost of keeping open marginal capacity.  If 
the formula for the capacity payment is mistaken, we should not get the wrong price, which is 
set by the stations’ costs, but the wrong capacity margin.  If the loss of load probability is 
over-estimated, (so that 10 GW of spare capacity appears to imply the risk of power cuts 
which would not actually occur until spare capacity fell to 5 GW), we will not face 
significantly higher prices, but excess (old) capacity and too low a risk of power cuts - not 
necessarily something to which consumers would object. 
 What would happen if capacity payments were abolished?  We will still need a few 
stations which are only used infrequently, and they must be able to cover their costs from 
doing so.  In a competitive market, prices should be based on marginal costs at all the times 
when these stations are “spare”, and so they will only recover capital costs when there is no 
slack in the system - either very little reserve, or actual demand rationing (by price or power 
cuts).  In a “pure” market without too much NGC intervention, generators might provide 
reserve in the hope of getting a really high price on the rare occasions when it was needed - 
how high the price will go depends on the amount of price-responsive demand that could 
react in time to affect the price, and whether there would be a ceiling for when non-price 
rationing was imposed, as in Australia.  Alternatively, NGC might contract with some 
stations for reserve, giving them lots of lower, but more predictable, payments.  I hope these 
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payments would be linked to the value of having the reserve available - that is, linked to the 
expected value of the sort of payments that might be the outcome of a pure market system. 
 It would probably be “safest” to have NGC contracts, but stations bidding for these 
would only be able to bid above the marginal cost of providing reserve on the few hours each 
year when there was no surplus capacity.  (If there were more than a few such hours, it might 
be a sign for reinstating mothballed plant, while if there were none, closures would be 
suggested).  NGC’s prices in those hours would have to cover the plants’ fixed costs.  If those 
costs were £10,000 per MW, and they were spread over 100 hours, we would need an 
average payment of £100/MW per hour for providing reserve, over and above the marginal 
cost of doing so.  In a market equilibrium, entry and exit would ensure that stations got (just) 
enough to cover their costs, while (I hope) that NGC would be paying them the value of 
having those stations available. 
 Arbitrage between the reserve market and the generation markets would imply that 
stations would only want to generate at the times of scarce capacity if they could get a similar 
surplus above their generating costs.  So the price for generation would also have to rise quite 
a long way above marginal generation costs.  If generators have to bid before they know that 
capacity will be short, they would include the expected value of this surplus.  Prices set in 
advance would therefore be much less volatile than prices set close to the time of dispatch.  
The end result could well look rather like the pattern of prices seen in the present Pool and 
contract market. 
 
 
Demand-side bidding 
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I agree that the demand side needs to play a greater role in setting electricity prices.  At 
present, if the Pool announces high prices, some consumers may reduce their demand in 
response, and the most expensive generators may not be scheduled.  Although those stations 
were responsible for setting the high price, the fact that they were not used will not reduce 
SMP.  In fact, the cost of compensating them for being “constrained off” will be added to 
Uplift, increasing prices!  At the very least, NGC should be encouraged to take more account 
of demand response when predicting demand, but active bidding by suppliers would be 
preferable. 
 We should differentiate between suppliers who have demand-responsive customers, 
and those who do not, however.  Demand-responsive consumers can see high prices, react to 
them by shedding load, and reduce the amount of generation and reserve required.  This 
would tend to produce a flatter peak, with less total capacity required, and would probably 
imply lower peak prices, but for a longer period.  This would be a useful feature of the 
market. 
 Demand-side bidding by suppliers who do not have price-responsive consumers 
cannot alter the amount of generation required.  In the Pool system, it could lead to gaming, 
as suppliers under-estimate their demands in the hope of setting a lower Pool price, even 
though this would lead to higher Uplift payments as extra stations were brought on line to 
meet the undeclared demand.  In a system with several bilateral markets, generators could 
react to such gaming by reallocating their sales between the markets.  If suppliers reduced 
their demand in the long-term markets, hoping to buy power more cheaply at the day ahead 
stage, generators could reduce the amount of capacity they offer to those markets.  Arbitrage 
should ensure that the expected price in each market is the same, but this sort of demand-side 
participation, where suppliers have to choose how to purchase power to meet fixed demand 
levels, will not reduce prices on its own.  The only way to do that is to ensure that price-
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responsive demand can react to prices, and that the reaction feeds back to the price-setting 
process. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Pool has made many enemies in the years since 1990, and it is now to be abolished.  In 
the past, the coal industry and some large customers were able to trade with the electricity 
industry at advantageous prices, and this is hard to maintain in an open market with published 
prices.  It may be that they hope that a system of bilateral markets will allow a return to the 
era of special deals.  The electricity industry has not been able to defend the system: the 
RECs are associated with the gas-fired power stations which have caused the decline of the 
coal industry, while the largest generators may gain from the changes.  Their market power 
may be enhanced in the less transparent world of bilateral trading, while the government’s 
restrictions on new entry remove a significant threat to their position. 
 Blaming the Pool for the decline of the coal industry has been politically convenient 
for the government, since it implies that replacing the Pool could be sufficient to arrest the 
decline.  This is unlikely to be the case.  Excessive entry by gas-fired power stations has been 
a response to market power which was facilitated by bilateral contracts, and it is those 
contracts which have caused them to operate at times when it would have been cheaper to 
burn coal.  The Pool has generally sent the right price signals, but they have been ignored. 
Increasing the role of bilateral contracts hardly seems the best way to deal with this problem! 
 The idea that paying people more than they asked for raises prices and distorts 
competition is superficially attractive.  A little analysis should reveal that prices in a pay-bid 
system could well be almost identical to those in the Pool, or those that a reformed Pool, with 
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some of its anomalies cleaned up, could produce.viii  For I am not pretending that the Pool is 
perfect.  Its governance structure, which allows small minorities to delay sensible changes for 
years, is crying out for reform.  The demand side needs to play a greater role in setting prices, 
and the rules have too many loopholes for generators to “game”.  But overall, it has been a 
sensible foundation for the electricity reforms in England and Wales.  An efficient bilateral 
market would probably produce very similar results to the Pool.  Abolishing the Pool in 
favour of a less transparent market, at greater risk of manipulation by the dominant 
generators, does not seem a rational policy. 
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Figure 1:  Pool Prices: Time-weighted Averages 
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Figure 2 :  Generation in England and Wales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
Figure 3 :  Forecast Electricity Trades 
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i The rate was expressed in £/kW of average demand during the three half-hours.  The CEGB had also charged 
the Area Boards a further £20/kW for their average demand during the next 250 highest half-hours, on the 
grounds that the stations which were marginal at these times had higher fixed costs than the peaking stations - 
this was about 16p/kWh. 
ii If enough customers can react to prices in real time, then they could reduce their demand as prices start to rise, 
and the equilibrium price would be just sufficient to keep demand down to the level of capacity.  If customers 
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cannot react in this way, and “random” power cuts are needed, then there is no limit to the price that the 
generators could set, if they were allowed to set it after the shortage has appeared.  In Australia, a (very high) 
administered price is used in these circumstances. 
iii The expected cost is the economic value of the load which cannot be met (deemed to be VOLL), less the 
short-run marginal cost of meeting it, believed to equal SMP. 
iv Generation itself is not a contestable activity, for a station remains a sunk investment.  The contract market is 
contestable, however, for it costs relatively little to arrange the package of contracts, and once they are signed, 
the new entrant is protected from most price risks. 
v This originally contained five generator representatives (in practice, delegates from National Power, 
PowerGen, Nuclear Electric, and two representing the other generators) and five suppliers (four RECs, with 
each seat rotating among three companies, and an independent supplier).  The four REC representatives often 
held a pre-meeting, after which they voted as a block.  The structure has since been reformed to reflect the 
blurred distinction between generators and suppliers (many companies are both) and allow some customer 
observers. 
vi The limits, set in MW of capacity, were roughly equal to 15% of the peak demand in each REC’s area.  Since 
the average electricity demand is about two-thirds the peak demand, a REC which was using all of its limit 
could have met about a quarter of its “native load”, or half of its sales to small customers (under 100 kW, who 
could not choose their supplier until 1998). 
vii Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 requires new stations to obtain a consent from the government, but this 
had not previously been a significant barrier. 
viii Bower and Bunn (1999) use a simulation model to predict that a move to hour-by-hour bilateral trading 
would significantly increase prices, compared to the Pool’s daily auction! 
